Differentially Testing Soundness and Precision of Program Analyzers by Klinger, Christian et al.
Differentially Testing
Soundness and Precision of Program Analyzers
Christian Klinger
Saarland University, Germany
io@klinch.de
Maria Christakis
MPI-SWS, Germany
maria@mpi-sws.org
Valentin Wu¨stholz
ConsenSys, Germany
valentin.wustholz@consensys.net
Abstract—In the last decades, numerous program analyzers
have been developed both by academia and industry. Despite
their abundance however, there is currently no systematic way of
comparing the effectiveness of different analyzers on arbitrary
code. In this paper, we present the first automated technique
for differentially testing soundness and precision of program
analyzers. We used our technique to compare six mature, state-of-
the art analyzers on tens of thousands of automatically generated
benchmarks. Our technique detected soundness and precision
issues in most analyzers, and we evaluated the implications of
these issues to both designers and users of program analyzers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Program analyzers are very effective in detecting code issues
and, especially in recent years, they are increasingly applied in
industry to detect defects in real-world software. Notable ex-
amples of such analyzers are Facebook’s Infer [1], [2], which
is used to find resource leaks and null-pointer exceptions in
Android and Java applications, Microsoft’s SAGE [3], which
is credited to have detected about one third of all security bugs
that were discovered with fuzzers during the development of
Windows 7 [4], and AbsInt’s Astre´e [5], [6], which can prove
the absence of runtime errors and invalid concurrent behavior
in safety-critical software, such as that of Airbus.
Despite the abundance of program analyzers that have been
produced both by academia and industry, there is currently no
systematic way of comparing their effectiveness on arbitrary
code. To compare the soundness and precision of a set of
analyzers, one could try them on a number of programs
to get a feel for their false positive or false negative rates.
However, just classifying the generated warnings as false or
true positives would require considerable human effort, let
alone determining whether any bugs are missed.
Alternatively, one could rely on the outcome of software
verification competitions such as SV-COMP [7], which com-
pares program analyzers based on an established collection of
verification tasks. Although verification competitions are ex-
tremely valuable in increasing the visibility of new analyzers,
providing a discussion forum for state-of-the-art techniques,
and maintaining a set of programs with explicit properties to
be checked, the verification tasks are rather stable. As a conse-
quence, program analyzers can be designed to perform well in
such competitions by specifically tailoring their techniques to
the given benchmarks. In addition, the explicit checks might
not be representative of properties in real-world software.
Our approach. To address these issues, we present the
first automated technique for differentially testing program
analyzers on arbitrary code. Given a set of seed programs,
our approach automatically generates program-analysis bench-
marks and compares the soundness and precision of the
analyzers on these benchmarks. As a result, the effectiveness
of the different program analyzers is evaluated in a systematic
and automated way, the benchmarks are hardly predictable,
and the explicit checks can be parameterized to express several
types of properties, for instance, numerical, non-nullness, or
points-to properties.
However, as for existing differential testing techniques, it is
challenging to automatically derive the ground truth, for exam-
ple, which warnings are indeed true positives or which errors
are missed. We address this challenge by leveraging Engler
et al.’s “bugs-as-deviant-behavior” strategy [8]. Specifically,
when most program analyzers agree that a certain property
does not hold, our approach detects a potential soundness issue
in the deviant analyzers, which find that the property does
hold. Conversely, we detect a potential precision issue when
a few analyzers claim that a property does not hold, while the
majority of analyzers verify the property.
The work most closely related to ours is by Kapus and
Cadar, who use random program generation and differential
testing to find bugs in symbolic execution engines [9]. In
contrast to this work, our approach focuses on detecting
soundness and precision issues in any program analyzer, poten-
tially including a test generator based on symbolic execution.
Moreover, our technique automatically generates program-
analysis benchmarks from a given set of seed programs,
possibly containing code that is difficult to handle by program
analysis. In general, it is very challenging to randomly gen-
erate programs from scratch such that they reveal soundness
and precision issues in mature analyzers, which is why our
technique leverages the seed programs.
Overall, we expect our approach to guide users in making
informed choices when selecting a program analyzer. How-
ever, this is not to say that the best analyzer is the most
sound; users have varying needs depending on how critical
the correctness of their code is and where in the software de-
velopment cycle they are (e.g., before a code review or product
release) [10]. We also expect our technique to assist designers
of analyzers in detecting soundness and precision issues of
their implementation, and to help enrich the collection of tasks
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used in verification competitions by automatically generating
challenging, yet less predictable, benchmarks.
Contributions. We make the following contributions:
– We present the first automated technique for differentially
testing soundness and precision of program analyzers on
arbitrary code.
– We implement this technique in a tool architecture that
compares analyzers on C programs and may be instanti-
ated with any program analyzer for C.
– We used our technique to compare six state-of-the-art
program analyzers on about 26,000 programs. We found
soundness and precision issues in four (out of six)
analyzers, and we evaluated their significance to both
program-analysis designers and users.
Terminology. Since terminology varies across different
program-analysis techniques, we introduce the following terms
that we use throughout the paper. Sound program analysis
over-approximates the set of possible executions in a given
program in order to prove the absence of errors in the program.
Due to its over-approximation, sound analysis may generate
false positives, that is, spurious warnings about executions that
are not erroneous or even possible in the program. In contrast,
a true positive is a warning about an actual error in the
program. Unsound program analysis may over-approximate
certain program executions and under-approximate others in
order to find bugs, rather than prove their absence. In case an
unsound analysis fails to detect an error in the program, we
say that it generates a false negative.
An imprecise program analysis abstracts certain program
executions such that it considers more executions than those
feasible in the program. Although an imprecise analysis might
generate false positives, it is not necessarily sound. On the
other hand, a precise program analysis uses abstractions that
closely describe executions in the program to generate as few
false positives as possible.
Outline. The next section gives an overview of our approach
through a running example. Sect. III explains the technical
details of our approach, while Sect. IV describes our imple-
mentation. We present our experimental evaluation and threats
to the validity of our results in Sect. V. We discuss related
work in Sect. VI and conclude in Sect. VII.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we illustrate the workflow and tool architec-
ture of our differential testing technique for program analyzers,
shown in Fig. 1.
Workflow. Our technique, which is implemented in a tool
called α-Diff (pronounced “alpha-diff”), takes as input one or
more correct seed programs that do not contain any (explicit or
implicit) assertions. Because these programs are both correct
and assertion-free, program analyzers (even if sound and
imprecise) do not generate any warnings for them.
Next, α-Diff parses a seed program, and based on one of its
search strategies (Sect. III-A), a program location is selected.
At this location, α-Diff synthesizes and introduces a check,
in the form of an assertion, expressing a property of interest
seed program P
α-Diff
Issue
Detector
Check
Synthesizer
Program
Analyzers
soundness and
precision issues
P P ′
warnings
Figure 1: Overview of the workflow and tool architecture.
(e.g., a numerical property) and involving variables that are
in scope at the program location (Sect. III-A). We call the
resulting program a variant of the seed program.
On this program variant, which now contains a single
assertion, α-Diff runs a set of program analyzers. The results
of the analyzers, that is, the presence or absence of any
generated warnings for the assertion, are recorded.
Subsequently, α-Diff selects a new program location in
the same seed program and repeats the process until a given
budget (i.e., number of synthesized checks for a particular seed
program) is depleted. The tool then continues to parse another
seed program, if any.
When all seed programs have been instrumented and ana-
lyzed until the budget, α-Diff compares the recorded results
and reports any detected soundness and precision issues in the
analyzers (Sect. III-B).
Example. Fig. 2 shows a simplified version of an SV-COMP
benchmark that we used in our experimental evaluation as a
seed program to test six program analyzers. (Lines 4 and 7
should be ignored for now.) Note that this program is correct
and does not contain any assertions. Therefore, when running
all analyzers on this code, no warnings are generated.
When passing this seed program to α-Diff, the ‘Check
Synthesizer’ (from Fig. 1), which is implemented to synthesize
checks for numerical properties, introduces the assertion on
line 4. Our tool then runs all analyzers on the resulting
program variant, whose assertion can obviously fail. All ana-
lyzers detect the assertion violation except for CBMC [11],
a bounded model checker for C and C++ programs, and
SMACK [12], a software verifier that translates the LLVM
intermediate representation into the Boogie intermediate veri-
fication language [13]. CBMC typically unrolls loops as many
times as necessary such that all bugs are found, but we
imposed a time limit on all analyzers, which proved to be
insufficient for CBMC to unroll the loop enough times such
1 int main() {
2 int i = 0;
3 while (i < 100000) {
4 assert i != 13; // soundness issue
5 i = i + 1;
6 }
7 assert i != 10; // precision issue
8 return i;
9 }
Figure 2: Soundness and precision issues in SMACK.
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that the assertion violation is detected. (Note, however, that
CBMC does find the bug with a higher time limit.) Still,
CBMC soundly returns ‘unknown’, that is, no bugs were found
but, due to reaching the time limit, the program has not been
verified. On the other hand, SMACK claims to have verified
the assertion on line 4, which indicates a soundness issue.
We reported this issue1 to the designers of SMACK, who
told us that the assertion violation is missed due to a size-
reduction heuristic, which searches for large constants in SV-
COMP benchmarks, such as 100000 in Fig. 2, and replaces
them with smaller numbers, in our case with 10, to reduce
the benchmark size. This heuristic is unsound and specifically
tailored to the competition benchmarks.
In addition to being a source of unsoundness, this heuristic
can also be the cause of imprecision. For example, consider
the program variant of Fig. 2 with the assertion on line 7 (and
without the assertion on line 4). This assertion is introduced
by α-Diff within the budget that is assigned to the seed
program from SV-COMP, and it can never fail. All analyzers
but SMACK are able to verify this program. However, because
of the size-reduction heuristic, SMACK knows that variable i
is equal to 10 right after the loop, and therefore, the verifier
reports an assertion violation, indicating a precision issue.
III. DIFFERENTIAL TESTING OF PROGRAM ANALYZERS
In this section, we describe the main components of our
workflow in more detail and explain precisely how we detect
soundness and precision issues in program analyzers.
A. Check Synthesis
The check-synthesis component consists of two aspects:
(1) the instrumentation, which creates a check and introduces
it at a certain location in the seed program to generate a
variant, and (2) the search strategies, which explore the space
of possible seed-program variants that may be generated. We
discuss these aspects next.
Instrumentation. Alg. 1 describes how α-Diff generates a
variant P ′ from a seed program P . First, the algorithm selects
a candidate expression e at program location l in P . In our
context, a candidate expression is a pure expression of integral
type that reads from at least one variable, e.g., c + 3 or
a[i], where c is a variable of type char and a is an array
of integers. (Note that the choice of expression e is made
according to a search strategy.) Next, the algorithm generates
a constant k , which is used, together with expression e , to
create an assertion of the form assert e != k . To generate
variant P ′, this assertion is inserted at location l in P . As an
example, consider the assertion on line 4 of Fig. 2, which is
introduced at the program location where expression i (right-
hand side of the assignment on line 5) is found in seed program
P . Similarly, the assertion on line 7 is inserted at the location
of the return statement in P .
The assertions introduced by α-Diff in a seed program
check numerical properties. In particular, they check whether
1https://github.com/smackers/smack/issues/324
Algorithm 1 Check synthesis
Input: seed program P
1 // Pick candidate expression e at program location l .
2 e, l ← GETCANDIDATEEXPRESSION(P)
3 // Pick constant k .
4 k ← GENERATECONSTANT(P , e)
5 // Create check.
6 s ← assert e != k
7 // Instrument program P by inserting statement s .
8 P ′ ← INSERTATLOCATION(P , l, s)
Output: program variant P ′
candidate expression e can ever have value k at program
location l . If so, then the assertion can fail, and the tested
analyzers should detect this violation in order to be sound. If
the expression can never have this value at that location, then
the assertion cannot fail, and the analyzers should not detect
any violation in order to be precise.
Note that, although α-Diff generates program variants that
check numerical properties, the ‘Check Synthesizer’ of Fig. 1
is configurable and may be extended to also synthesize other
types of properties. Still, as we discuss in Sect. V-C, numerical
properties were sufficient in detecting soundness and precision
issues in most of the analyzers we tested.
Batch checks. To reduce the number of times the program
analyzers are invoked, α-Diff can also synthesize assertions
with multiple conjuncts, which we call ‘batch checks’. For
example, a program variant of Fig. 2 could check whether
i is ever equal to 10 or 11 on line 7 with the assertion
assert i != 10 && i != 11. Recall that, at this pro-
gram location, SMACK knows that i has value 10 and would,
therefore, detect a violation only due to the first conjunct
of the above assertion. For such cases, α-Diff uses divide-
and-conquer to eliminate conjuncts that do not cause any
disagreement between the program analyzers. We evaluate the
effectiveness of our technique when synthesizing assertions
with batch checks in Sect. V-C.
Search strategies. In addition to generating a value k ,
Alg. 1 also explores the search space of possible candidate
expressions e . Our technique navigates this space using a num-
ber of static and dynamic search strategies, which we describe
below and evaluate in Sect. V-C. Note that the search strategies
are applied by the GETCANDIDATEEXPRESSION function in
Alg. 1, which is configurable in our implementation.
Static strategies. Static strategies traverse the abstract syntax
tree (AST) of the seed program to collect all the candidate
expressions. These strategies then compute a weight we for
each candidate expression e (according to a weight function),
sum all weights to compute the total wt, and assign to each
expression e the probability we/wt of being selected by func-
tion GETCANDIDATEEXPRESSION. Overall, α-Diff supports
three static strategies that differ in their weight functions:
– The Uniform-Random strategy selects candidate expres-
sions uniformly. In other words, all possible locations
have a weight of 1.
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– The Breadth-Biased strategy assigns to each candidate
expression at location l a weight of 1/depth(l), where
depth(l) is the depth of location l in the AST. This means
that this strategy assigns larger weights to locations
higher in the AST.
– The Depth-Biased strategy assigns to each candidate
expression at location l a weight of depth(l), that is,
larger weights are assigned to locations lower in the AST.
Dynamic strategies. Dynamic strategies do not assign fixed
weights to the candidate expressions. Instead, these strategies
select an initial expression and then traverse the AST in
different directions to select another. Our tool supports the
following two dynamic strategies that differ in how they
traverse the AST:
– The Random-Walk strategy selects an initial candidate
expression at the first possible location in the main func-
tion of the seed program. To select another expression,
this strategy moves in a random direction in the AST,
for instance, to the subsequent statement, the previous
compound statement, or into a function call.
– The Guided-Walk strategy is a variation of Random-
Walk. In comparison, this strategy favors moves to loca-
tions in the AST that are likely to increase differences in
the running times of the program analyzers, for example,
by moving deeper in a compound statement.
B. Detection of Soundness and Precision Issues
A common challenge for differential testing techniques is
detecting issues with a low false-positive rate, instead of
reporting all found differences. In our context, this requires
determining whether the analysis results are indeed sound or
precise and, in particular, whether any generated warnings
are spurious or miss errors in the program. To address this
challenge, α-Diff uses two mechanisms for detecting sound-
ness and precision issues in the tested analyzers, namely, the
deviance and unsoundness detection mechanisms.
Deviance detection. Given a program variant (with a single
assertion), analyzers return one of the following verdicts: safe
(i.e., the assertion cannot fail), unsafe (i.e., the assertion can
fail), or unknown (i.e., it is unknown whether the assertion can
fail, likely because the analysis times out).
The deviance detection mechanism is inspired by Engler
et al.’s “bugs as deviant behavior” [8]. Specifically, given
a program variant, when the majority of program analyzers
return unsafe, α-Diff detects a potential soundness issue in the
deviant analyzers that return safe. Conversely, α-Diff detects a
potential precision issue when a few analyzers return unsafe,
while the majority of analyzers return safe.
We call an analyzer δ-unsound with respect to a program
variant when it returns safe and δ other analyzers return unsafe.
Analogously, an analyzer is δ-imprecise with respect to a
variant when it returns unsafe and δ other analyzers return safe.
For each tested analyzer, α-Diff ranks all detected soundness
(resp. precision) issues in order of decreasing severity, where
severity is proportional to δ, that is, to the number of dis-
agreeing analyzers. For instance, for the program variant of
Fig. 2 containing the assertion on line 7, we say that SMACK
is 5-imprecise since all other analyzers disagree.
Unsoundness detection. Certain analyzers under-
approximate the set of possible executions in a given
program. Consequently, when such analyzers detect an error
in the program, this is inevitably a true positive (modulo
bugs in the analysis itself). We consider CBMC to be an
under-approximating program analyzer, for instance, because
it typically analyzes the program until a bound is reached
and uses bit-precise reasoning (i.e., no over-approximation).
When such analyzers (like CBMC) find that a program
variant is unsafe, then the assertion in the variant can definitely
fail. Therefore, any other analyzer that returns safe for the
same variant is unsound, and we call it must-unsound. On the
other hand, when CBMC returns safe, it is possible that it has
missed an assertion violation in the program variant due to
its under-approximation. For this reason, we do not use the
results of under-approximating analyzers to draw any definite
conclusions about imprecision in other analyzers.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the details of our implementation,
which is open source2.
Check synthesis. Recall from Alg. 1 that the check-
synthesis component of α-Diff generates a constant k , which is
used, together with a candidate expression, to form a check for
a numerical property. In general, the constants k are sampled
randomly but with a few tweaks.
To guide the sampling, our implementation uses the follow-
ing optimizations. First, while parsing a seed program, α-Diff
populates a pool of constants with any constant c encountered
in the program, c + 1 , c − 1 , and boundary values (such as
MIN INT , 0, and MAX INT ). The constants in the pool
are then used to complement the randomly sampled con-
stants. Second, our implementation does not sample constants
uniformly to avoid frequently generating very large values.
Instead, α-Diff uniformly selects a bit-width for a constant and
then randomly generates a sequence of bits with this width.
Third, for each check to be synthesized, we use a type checker
to determine the type of the candidate expression and, thus, the
bit-width of the corresponding constant that will be generated
(e.g., 1 bit for expressions of type bool and 8 bits for char).
All these optimizations aim to bias or restrict the search
space of possible constants and, therefore, improve the effi-
ciency of our tool.
Program analysis runs. After invoking the program ana-
lyzers, our implementation persists the results of each analysis
run in a database. The database is extended with caching
capabilities allowing α-Diff to avoid re-running the analyzers
on program variants that have been previously generated.
Moreover, incorporating new program analyzers in α-Diff
is very easy since our implementation uses Docker containers
to install, set up, and run the analyzers. This also greatly
simplifies resource management and monitoring (e.g., memory
2https://github.com/Practical-Formal-Methods/adiff
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and CPU usage, or running time) as well as the parallelization
of analysis jobs.
Issue detection. To detect soundness or precision issues,
users can query the database of analysis results, either by writ-
ing their own queries or by using the default ones (described
in Sect. III-B). A query may be submitted either through the
command line or via a web-based user interface.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we apply
α-Diff to six state-of-the-art program analyzers. In this sec-
tion, we present our experimental setup (Sect. V-A), give an
overview of the tested analyzers (Sect. V-B), and investigate
several research questions (Sect. V-C).
A. Setup
We selected 1,393 seed programs (written in C) from
the SV-COMP repository of verification benchmarks [7]. We
excluded all programs that contain “float”, “driver”, or “eca-
rers2012” in their path. The first category of excluded pro-
grams cannot be handled by all program analyzers we tested,
while the other two categories mainly contain very large
benchmarks that caused most analyzers to reach the time
limit we set for our experiments. We also excluded any other
benchmark that crashed our type checker, for instance, some of
the programs that are automatically generated by PSYCO [14].
We chose these benchmarks as seed programs because five
out of the six program analyzers we tested have participated
in at least one SV-COMP over the years. We were, therefore,
confident that the analyzers would be able to handle most
of the selected programs. Moreover, SV-COMP benchmarks
typically do not exhibit arithmetic overflows to avoid penal-
izing analyzers that are intentionally unsound with respect to
overflow [15], [16].
In general, all SV-COMP benchmarks are annotated with
assertions (no other crashes should be possible), and user
inputs are made explicit. To use these benchmarks as seed
programs, α-Diff had to preprocess them. First, we removed all
existing assertions such that the seed programs are correct and
the program analyzers do not generate any warnings for them.
Second, we ran the GCC preprocessor to eliminate any macro
usages and, thus, avoid any parsing issues in the analyzers.
Unless stated explicitly, we used the following default
configuration of α-Diff: a time limit of 30s, 2 CPU cores, and
up to 8GB of memory per analysis run, a budget of either 100
or 20% of the number of candidate expressions (whichever
is smaller) per seed program, the Uniform-Random search
strategy, and a batch-check size of 4. Recall from Sect. III-A
that α-Diff can synthesize assertions with multiple conjuncts.
These are called batch checks, and we refer to the number of
conjuncts as the ‘batch-check size’.
We ran our experiments on a dual hexacore
Intel® Xeon® X5650 CPU @ 2.67GHz machine with
48 GiB of memory, running Debian Stretch.
B. Program Analyzers
We selected the analyzers under test such that they cover
a wide range of different analysis techniques. In addition, we
only chose mature tools that are under active development.
We give a short description of each analyzer below. Note that,
unless otherwise stated, we used their default configuration.
CBMC. CBMC [11] is a bit-precise bounded model checker
that unrolls loops and expresses verification conditions as SMT
queries over bit-vectors. We used version 5.3 of the tool.
CPAchecker. CPAchecker [17] is a software model checker
that incorporates different program-analysis techniques, such
as predicate abstraction [18], [19], lazy abstraction [20],
and k-induction [21]. We used the development version
51.7-svn28636 of the tool, which incorporates fixes for two
soundness issues that α-Diff detected. Note that CPAchecker
won the first place in SV-COMP’18.
Crab. Crab [22], [23] is an abstract interpreter that supports
several abstract domains [24], [25]. Its default configuration
uses the Zones domain [26], and we enabled inter-procedural
analysis. The tool was built from commit 5dd7a00b5b.
SeaHorn. SeaHorn [27] is a software model checker that
expresses verification conditions as Horn-clauses and uses
existing solvers to discharge them. Its default configuration
uses Spacer [28], [29], which is a fork of Z3 [30] with
a variant of the IC3/PDR [31] model-checking algorithm
for solving verification conditions. The tool was built from
commit 59c4a917a595.
SMACK. SMACK [12] is software model checker that
translates C programs to Boogie [13], which can be checked by
a number of different verification back-ends. We used version
1.9 with the default configuration, which runs the Corral
verifier [32]. We also enabled the svcomp extension and set
the loop-unrolling bound to 1,000. Note that SMACK won the
second place in SV-COMP’17.
Ultimate Automizer. Ultimate Automizer (or UAutomizer)
is a software model checker that uses an automata-based ver-
ification approach [33], [34], [35]. We used version 0.1.23.
Note that UAutomizer won the second place in SV-COMP’18.
For all program analyzers that support this, we set the
machine architecture to 32-bit. We also provided a default
LTL-specification file to any analyzer that requires an explicit
reachability property for checking assertions.
C. Results
We break our experimental results down into five categories,
each investigating a different research question.
RQ1: Does α-Diff find soundness and precision issues?
Given as input the 1,393 seed programs, α-Diff generated
25,960 program variants. Fig. 3 shows the number of potential
soundness issues that α-Diff detected in the tested program
analyzers when running them on the generated variants. Each
soundness issue corresponds to a program variant that revealed
an analyzer to be must- or δ-unsound. As shown in the figure,
our technique detected a significant number of potential issues
in four program analyzers. Note that some of these issues
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Figure 3: Soundness issues detected for each program analyzer.
might expose the same source of unsoundness in an analyzer.
For example, assume that α-Diff generates several variants that
use bitwise arithmetic in their assertions. For each of these
variants, our tool could potentially report a soundness issue in
any analyzer that does not support bit-precise reasoning.
We manually inspected all detected issues from Fig. 3
and reported unique sources of unsoundness to the designers
of Crab, SeaHorn, and SMACK. Note, however, that α-Diff
had previously found two soundness issues in CPAchecker,
which were reported to the tool designers early on and were
fixed34. We used the patched version of CPAchecker for our
experiments. We discuss the reaction of all designers in RQ2.
As shown in the figure, CPAchecker is found to be 3-
unsound for one program variant. This issue is actually a
source of imprecision in three other analyzers, namely, in
Crab, SeaHorn, and SMACK, and is related to bit-precise
reasoning. In general, we observed that the false-positive
rate of our technique depends on two main factors. First,
if some of the tested program analyzers are imprecise for a
given variant, α-Diff detects soundness issues in the remaining
analyzers, which are, however, sound. Second, any issues that
are reported for δ-unsound analyzers, where δ is small, are
likely false positives. For example, when a program analyzer
is 1-unsound, there exists only one disagreeing analyzer. In
fact, inspecting issues found for δ-unsound analyzers, where
δ is large, significantly reduces the number of false positives
caused by imprecision in some of the other analyzers. In the
results of Fig. 3, we did not find any false positives when
δ ≥ 4 or when inspecting the issues that were detected for
must-unsound analyzers.
Fig. 4 shows the number of precision issues that α-Diff
found for the same program variants. Although the number of
issues is significant, the majority of these do not correspond
to bugs in the analyzers. Instead, most of the precision issues
are either intended by the analysis designers (for instance,
imprecise reasoning about numeric types) or inherent to the
analysis (for example, imprecision in non-relational abstract
domains, such as Intervals).
Overall, α-Diff found many more precision issues in Crab
in comparison to the other analyzers. These issues, however,
are intended since Crab favors performance over precision,
similarly to several other abstract interpreters. Manual inspec-
3https://groups.google.com/d/msg/cpachecker-users/3JCOeNuoleA/fpr8ElaaBgAJ
4https://groups.google.com/d/msg/cpachecker-users/3JCOeNuoleA/YDT7LokZBwAJ
tion of a selection of these issues showed that the program
variants for which Crab is imprecise exhibited at least one
of the following features: (1) usage of pointers, (2) bitwise
operations, (3) invariants expressing parity of variables.
In addition to detecting issues in program analyzers, α-
Diff can also compare their relative soundness and precision.
To determine the relative precision (resp. soundness) of an
analyzer Ai with respect to another analyzer Aj , our technique
computes the probability that Ai returns safe (resp. unsafe)
given that Aj returns safe (resp. unsafe). Tab. 1 shows these
probabilities for all analyzers under test. Note that <1.00
stands for a probability between 0.99 and 1.00.
From the first row of the table, we observe that CBMC
verifies only 1% of the variants that all other analyzers prove
safe. This is due to the fact that CBMC uses bounded model
checking, which might fail to explore all program paths within
a certain time limit. In contrast, CPAchecker verifies 71%
of the variants that CBMC proves safe. As another example,
SeaHorn verifies almost all variants that UAutomizer proves
safe, while UAutomizer verifies only 81% of the variants
that SeaHorn proves safe. This clearly indicates that SeaHorn
is more precise on the generated program variants. On the
other hand, α-Diff did not detect any soundness issues for
UAutomatizer (see Fig. 3), which could potentially explain
the higher precision of SeaHorn on some variants. In general,
analyzers might gain in precision when sacrificing soundness
since they consider fewer program executions.
Tab. 2 shows a direct comparison between SMACK and
Crab, which implement very different analysis techniques.
Note that >0% stands for a percentage between 0 and 1.
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Figure 4: Precision issues detected for each analyzer.
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Ai
Aj CBMC CPAchecker Crab SeaHorn SMACK UAutomatizer
CBMC 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
CPAchecker 0.71 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.99
Crab 0.37 0.63 1.00 0.62 0.88 0.68
SeaHorn 0.77 0.98 <1.00 1.00 0.99 <1.00
SMACK 0.72 0.53 0.76 0.53 1.00 0.61
UAutomatizer 0.57 0.82 0.89 0.81 0.93 1.00
Table 1: Relative precision for the tested program analyzers.
SMACK
Crab unsafe unknown safe
unsafe 14% 22% > 0%
unknown 30% 0% 7%
safe 3% 0% 23%
Table 2: Comparison of results for SMACK and Crab.
As shown in the table, for 3% of the program variants,
Crab reports unsafe whereas SMACK returns safe. Both tools
prove 23% of the variants safe and never return unknown for
the same program variant. This suggests that these analysis
techniques have complementary strengths and weaknesses.
In addition to comparing the results of different analyzers,
α-Diff can also be used to compare different configurations of
the same analyzer. Tab. 3 shows a direct comparison of two
Crab configurations, each using a different abstract domain,
namely, Octagons [36] and Polyhedra [37]. As shown in the
table, there is a small number of program variants that are
verified with the Octagons domain but not with Polyhedra,
although in theory Polyhedra is strictly more precise than
Octagons. As pointed out by the designer of Crab5, this
mismatch is due to the fact that the domains use different
widening operations [38], [39] to speed up convergence of the
fixed-point computation. This is a known caveat [40] and was
independently evaluated in a recent paper comparing different
abstract domains [41].
In Tab. 4, we use α-Diff to compare the relative precision of
several abstract domains of Crab, namely, Intervals, Octagons,
Polyhedra, RTZ (i.e., the reduced product of disjunctive
Intervals and Zones), and Zones. Across the domains, the
differences in precision are small for the generated variants.
However, not surprisingly, the Intervals domain is typically
less precise than the others. For instance, Intervals can only
verify 89% of the variants that are proved safe with Zones. On
the other hand, the very precise Polyhedra domain can only
verify 99% of the variants that are proved safe with Intervals.
As previously explained, this is due to the widening operation.
RQ2: Are the issues relevant for designers of analyzers?
To determine whether the issues that α-Diff reports are rele-
vant to analysis designers, we inspected all detected soundness
issues as well as a selection of precision issues. Overall, we
found ten unique soundness and precision issues in four (out of
six) program analyzers (excluding CBMC and UAutomizer).
We reported nine of these issues to the designers of the four
analyzers. All reported issues were confirmed and three (in
CPAchecker and Crab) were fixed in only a few hours each.
We now discuss the detected issues in detail.
CPAchecker. Although for the experiments in this paper we
used the patched version of CPAchecker, α-Diff detected two
5https://github.com/seahorn/crab-llvm/issues/18
oct
pk unsafe unknown safe
unsafe 43% 1% > 0%
unknown > 0% 10% > 0%
safe > 0% > 0% 45%
Table 3: Comparison of Crab Octagons and Polyhedra.
sources of unsoundness in this analyzer, which were imme-
diately fixed. The first soundness issue6 was revealed in the
simplified version of a program variant shown in Fig. 5 (line 4
should be ignored). In this program, x is assigned a non-
deterministic integer and, therefore, the assertion on line 3 can
fail. A previous version of CPAchecker missed this assertion
violation due to a bug in its invariant-generation component,
which was unsound when trying to obtain information about
the factors of a multiplication whose product was zero.
The second issue7 was revealed in the simplified variant
of Fig. 5 when considering line 4 (and ignoring line 3).
According to the C standard, the expression x == 1 evaluates
to an integer of value 0 or 1, which is never equal to 99.
Consequently, the assertion on line 4 can fail since x is
assigned a non-deterministic integer. CPAchecker missed this
assertion violation due to a bug in its value analysis, which
was unsound when analyzing nested binary expressions such
as the property asserted above.
Crab. Our technique detected two soundness issues in
Crab. The first issue8 made the inter-procedural analysis of
Crab unsound in the presence of recursion, and the bug was
immediately fixed.
The second issue (which was reported together with the
first) is caused by Crab’s LLVM-based [42] front-end, which
may optimize the program by exploiting undefined behav-
ior. For example, several seed programs contain uninitialized
variables. According to the C standard, the behavior of a
program that reads from such variables is undefined, that
is, any behavior is correct. In these cases, a compiler pass
may under-approximate the behavior of the program, for
instance, by assuming that any read from an uninitialized
variable returns 0, to optimize the executable code. However,
this under-approximation potentially leads to unsoundness in
program analyzers that analyze the optimized code, given that
the original program may fail when compiled without this
optimization or with a different compiler.
We also reported two imprecision issues9 in the Polyhedra
and Octagons domains of Crab. In particular, the less precise
Intervals domain was able to verify the assertion in a program
6https://groups.google.com/d/msg/cpachecker-users/3JCOeNuoleA/fpr8ElaaBgAJ
7https://groups.google.com/d/msg/cpachecker-users/3JCOeNuoleA/YDT7LokZBwAJ
8https://github.com/seahorn/crab-llvm/issues/20
9https://github.com/seahorn/crab-llvm/issues/18
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Di
Dj int oct pk rtz zones
int 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.89
oct 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
pk 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99
rtz <1.00 <1.00 0.99 1.00 <1.00
zones 1.00 <1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00
Table 4: Relative precision for abstract domains of Crab.
variant, whereas the more precise Polyhedra domain found the
variant unsafe. As discussed in RQ1, such precision issues are
possible for abstract domains with a widening operation. The
issue was similar for the Octagons domain, which typically ig-
nores dis-equalities. In contrast, given the interval x = [0, 10]
and the constraint x 6= 10, the Intervals domain does compute
the more precise interval x = [0, 9].
SeaHorn. We reported a soundness10 and a precision issue11
to the designers of SeaHorn, who confirmed both issues. The
soundness issue was caused by SeaHorn’s LLVM-based front-
end, which is slightly different than Crab’s and, thus, results
in different unsound results.
Regarding the precision issue, the designers of SeaHorn
explained that it is due to the conservative handling of bitwise
operations and numeric types. In particular, all numeric types
are abstracted into arbitrary-precision signed integers.
SMACK. We reported the soundness and precision issues12
that are caused by the size-reduction heuristic in SMACK (see
Sect. II for details). Although confirmed, these issues were not
fixed since this behavior was intended by the designers.
We also found several other soundness issues, which were
due to optimizations by SMACK’s LLVM-based front-end,
just like in Crab and SeaHorn. We did not report these issues
to the designers since their cause is clear.
In general, the reaction of the analysis designers to all
reported issues shows that α-Diff can detect important sources
of unsoundness and imprecision. This is especially the case
since the tested analyzers are mature tools that are under active
development. Moreover, five of these analyzers (excluding
Crab) have participated in SV-COMP, which did not reveal
any of the above bugs.
RQ3: Are the controversial issues relevant for users?
Half of the tested program analyzers, namely Crab, SeaHorn,
and SMACK, might be unsound in the presence of undefined
behavior. As discussed earlier, this unsoundness is caused by
compiler optimizations that under-approximate the behavior
of the program. We call such soundness issues controversial
because different compilers are inconsistent in reasoning about
undefined behavior and, consequently, the results of analyzers
that analyze executable code can be contradictory.
To shed more light on what users expect from program
analyzers in the presence of undefined behavior, we performed
a survey of 16 professional developers, who we hired on Up-
work13. To screen the candidates, we used two short interview
questions (about type-conversion rules and pointer usage in
10https://github.com/seahorn/seahorn/issues/152
11https://github.com/seahorn/seahorn/issues/157
12https://github.com/smackers/smack/issues/324
13https://www.upwork.com/
1 int main() {
2 int x = ?;
3 assert 2 * x != 0;
4 assert (x == 1) != 99 && x == 1;
5 return x == 1;
6 }
Figure 5: Soundness issues in CPAchecker.
C). Out of the candidates that replied correctly, we selected
those that had experience with C.
The survey contained 9 short tasks. Each task included a
short C program, which was a simplified version of a program
variant generated by α-Diff. For every task, we asked whether
the assertion in the given program can fail, and just like a
program analyzer, a survey participant could respond with yes
(i.e., unsafe), no (i.e., safe), and I don’t know (i.e., unknown).
To pilot the survey tasks, we sent the survey to 4 students
and interns who study Computer Science and already have a
Bachelor’s degree. We asked these participants if they found
any portion of the survey difficult to understand and requested
their feedback. Their responses were solely used to improve
the survey.
After finalizing the tasks, we sent the survey to the profes-
sional developers. The tasks were presented to the developers
in a randomized order, but in total, the survey included 6
non-controversial and 3 controversial questions. The non-
controversial questions asked about programs for which most
analyzers were in agreement regarding their safety, whereas
the controversial questions asked about unsafe programs that
contained undefined behavior. We used the non-controversial
tasks to exclude participants who gave the wrong answer to at
least 4 (out of 6) of these questions. Based on this threshold,
we excluded 4 (out of 16) survey participants.
Tab. 5 shows the survey responses from the 12 developers
that we did not exclude. The first column shows the task
identifier: tasks 1–6 are non-controversial and tasks 7–9 are
controversial. Next to each task identifier, we indicate whether
there exists an execution of the corresponding program that
fails. For example, when the executable code of the programs
in tasks 7–9 is not optimized, the assertions can be violated.
The remaining columns of the table show the survey responses
categorized as unsafe, unknown, and safe.
As shown in the table, the majority of the participants (10
out of 12 professional developers) considered the controversial
programs to be unsafe. This clearly suggests that program
analyzers should treat undefined behavior as non-determinism,
instead of optimizing it away. On the other hand, the 4
Task Survey Response
Identifier unsafe unknown safe
1 (unsafe) 11 0 1
2 (unsafe) 12 0 0
3 (unsafe) 11 0 1
4 (safe) 2 0 10
5 (safe) 0 0 12
6 (safe) 0 0 12
7 (unsafe) 10 1 1
8 (unsafe) 10 1 1
9 (unsafe) 10 1 1
Table 5: Survey responses from professional C developers.
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Search Strategy Number of Detected Issues
must-unsound ≥ 3-unsound ≥ 3-imprecise
Uniform-Random 2 2 71
Breadth-Biased 1 2 70
Depth-Biased 1 1 77
Random-Walk 0 0 59
Guided-Walk 1 2 39
Table 6: Effect of search strategies on the number of
detected issues.
excluded developers were not able to give correct answers
to at least 4 questions from tasks 1–6, and the remaining 12
developers gave 4 wrong answers to these tasks (see Tab. 5).
This is a strong indication that even professional C developers
benefit from program analysis.
RQ4: What is the effect of the search strategy? To
generate a seed-program variant, our technique explores the
search space of all possible candidate expressions using five
different search strategies (see Sect. III-A). To evaluate how
each search strategy affects the number of detected issues,
we ran α-Diff on 20 seed programs, which were randomly
selected from the seed programs used in the evaluation of
RQ1. For each run of α-Diff on the seed programs, we enabled
a different search strategy, and we measured the number of
soundness and precision issues that were found. We used the
default configuration of our tool, but with a batch-check size
of 1, to prevent batch checks from influencing the results.
Tab. 6 shows the effect of the five search strategies on
the number of detected issues. The first column of the table
shows the search strategy, the second the cumulative number of
soundness issues detected in all must-unsound analyzers, the
third the soundness issues detected in ≥ 3-unsound analyzers
(that is, in 3-, 4-, and 5-unsound analyzers), and the fourth
the precision issues detected in ≥ 3-imprecise analyzers. In
general, the results suggest that the static search strategies
are more effective in detecting soundness and precision issues
than the dynamic strategies. Among the static strategies,
the Uniform-Random strategy helps find the most soundness
issues, although the differences are small. Among the dynamic
strategies, the Random-Walk strategy performs the worst. We
also observed that Breadth-Biased and Guided-Walk each
detect a soundness issue that is not found by any other strategy.
RQ5: What is the effect of batch checks? To evaluate
the influence of the batch-check size on the effectiveness of
our approach, we ran α-Diff on the same seed programs that
were selected for the evaluation of RQ4. We used the Uniform-
Random search strategy, and otherwise, the same configuration
of our tool as in the experiment of RQ4.
Tab. 7 shows the effect of the batch-check size on the
Batch-Check Size Number of Detected Issues
must-unsound ≥ 3-unsound ≥ 3-imprecise
1 2 2 71
2 6 6 110
4 3 5 158
8 10 10 193
16 9 10 165
32 11 22 201
Table 7: Effect of batch-check size on the number of
detected issues.
number of detected issues. Overall, larger batch-check sizes
are more effective in detecting soundness and precision issues.
During our experiments, we also found that larger batch-check
sizes typically help in detecting the same issues faster (that is,
with a smaller initial budget) in comparison to smaller sizes.
D. Threats to Validity
We have identified the following threats to the validity of
our experiments.
Selection of seed programs. Our experimental results may
not generalize to other seed programs [43]. However, we
evaluated our technique by selecting seed programs from
most categories of a well-established repository of verification
tasks [7] and by running the program analyzers on tens of
thousands of program variants. We, therefore, believe that our
benchmark selection significantly helps mitigate this threat and
aids generalizability of our results.
Selection of program analyzers. For our experiments,
we used the program analyzers described in Sect. V-B. Our
findings depend on bugs, unsoundness, and imprecision in
these analyzers and, thus, may not generalize. However, our se-
lection includes a wide range of program-analysis techniques,
like model checking and abstract interpretation. Moreover, all
of these techniques are implemented in mature tools.
Type of checked properties. Our results may also not
generalize to other types of checks, for example, for points-
to properties. Our implementation targets numerical safety
properties since they are found in almost every program and
can, therefore, be checked by most analyzers. Independently,
our approach and implementation are configurable and may
be extended to also synthesize other types of properties, for
instance, by checking if two pointers are aliases.
Randomness in check synthesis. Another potential threat
has to do with the internal validity [43] of our experiments,
which refers to whether any systematic errors are introduced in
the experimental setup. A typical threat to the internal validity
of experiments with randomized techniques is the selection
of seeds. Recall that our check-synthesis component selects
candidate expressions and constants in a randomized way.
To ensure deterministic results and to avoid favoring certain
program analyzers over others, α-Diff uses the same, pre-
defined random seeds for all analyzer configurations.
Survey of developers. A potential threat to the validity of
our results is that the survey questions were not understandable
or presented in a clear way. To alleviate this concern, we
piloted the survey and fine-tuned the questions based on
the feedback we received. Moreover, the survey responses
might not be representative of other professional C developers.
However, we screened the candidates and excluded any survey
participants who did not seem experienced enough.
VI. RELATED WORK
In the literature, there are several techniques for evaluating
different qualities of program analyzers. Especially to ensure
soundness of an analyzer, existing work has explored a wide
spectrum of techniques requiring varying degrees of human
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effort, for instance, manual proofs (e.g., [44]), interactive and
automatic proofs (e.g., [45], [46]), testing (e.g., [47], [48]),
and “smoke checking” [13]. There also exist evaluations of
the efficiency [49] and precision [50] of various analyses.
Our approach is the first to differentially test real-world
program analyzers with the goal of detecting soundness and
precision issues in arbitrary code. Specifically, we identify
such issues by comparing the results of several analyzers,
instead of relying on fixed test oracles.
Testing analyzers with randomly generated programs.
Running a program analyzer on randomly generated input pro-
grams has proved effective in revealing crashes [51]. However,
it is very challenging to randomly generate programs from
scratch such that they reveal soundness and precision issues in
mature analyzers. Instead, our approach takes as input existing,
complex programs as seeds and uses them to generate seed
variants by synthesizing checks for numerical properties.
Testing symbolic execution engines. Kapus and Cadar use
random program generation in combination with differential
testing to find bugs in symbolic execution engines [9], by
for instance comparing crashes, output differences, and code
coverage. Unlike our approach, this work specifically targets
symbolic execution engines and compares the tested engines
on randomly generated programs.
Testing abstract interpreters. A common technique for
revealing soundness issues in analyzers that infer invariants
(e.g., abstract interpreters [38], [24], [25]) is to turn inferred
invariants into explicit assertions and then check if the asser-
tions are violated in concrete executions of the program [51],
[52], [53]. Concrete executions (e.g., from existing test suites)
are also helpful in identifying certain precision issues by
observing the effect of intersecting the inferred invariants with
concrete runtime values on the number of generated warnings.
In contrast, our technique works for any type of safety
checker. In addition, if any of the tested analyzers perform
an under-approximation (e.g., a bounded model checker or a
dynamic symbolic execution engine), our technique essentially
compares the results of the other analyzers against a test suite
that is automatically generated on the fly.
A usual source of soundness and precision issues in abstract
interpreters is bugs in the implementation of the underlying
abstract domains and their operations (e.g., intersection and
union of abstract states). Existing techniques [47], [54], [48]
for detecting such issues use well-known mathematical prop-
erties of domains as test oracles. In contrast, our approach can
not only detect issues in domain implementations, but also in
abstract transformers, which model program statements such
as arithmetic operations or method calls.
Evaluating unsoundness in static analyzers. Unsoundness
is ubiquitous in static analyzers [15], typically to intentionally
favor other important qualities, such as precision or efficiency.
A recent technique systematically documents and evaluates
the sources of intentional unsoundness in a widely used,
commercial static analyzer [16]. The experimental evaluation
of this work sheds light on how often the unsoundness of the
analyzer causes it to miss bugs. In comparison, our approach
treats any tested program analyzer as a black box, and it is also
able to detect unintentional soundness and precision issues,
caused by bugs in the implementation of the analyzers.
Even more recently, an empirical study evaluated how many
known bugs are missed by three industrial-strength static bug
detectors [55]. An important difference with our approach is
that the checked properties in this study did not necessarily
lie within the capabilities of the analyzers. In contrast, we
synthesize numerical properties, which should be handled by
all analyzers we tested. Moreover, our approach automatically
synthesizes potentially erroneous programs and uses differen-
tial testing to identify both soundness and precision issues.
Formally verifying program analyzers. To avoid any
soundness issues in the first place, interactive theorem provers
are often used to verify the soundness of the design of a
program analyzer. For instance, this is a common approach
for type systems [56], [57]. However, such proofs cannot gen-
erally guarantee the absence of soundness issues in the actual
implementation of the analyzer. To address this problem, the
Verasco [58] project generates the executable code of several
abstract domains directly from their Coq formalizations. Even
if this approach were more practical, it would still not easily
detect precision issues in an analyzer.
Testing compilers. Compilers typically apply different
lightweight program analyses (e.g., constant propagation) to
produce more efficient code. Existing work [59], [60], [61],
[62], [63] has proposed several techniques for detecting bugs
in compilers, and indirectly, in their analyses. These techniques
often use metamorphic testing to derive test oracles [64], for
instance, by comparing the output of two compiled programs
where one is a slight, semantics-preserving modification of the
other. In contrast, our approach compares several analyzers at
once and uses their results to detect soundness and precision
issues. In addition, our check synthesis instruments the seed
program with assertions that may alter its semantics, for
example, by introducing failing executions.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a novel and automated technique for
differentially testing the soundness and precision of program
analyzers. We used it to test six mature, state-of-the-art ana-
lyzers on tens of thousands of programs. Our technique found
soundness and precision issues in four of these analyzers.
In future work, we plan to explore how to synthesize
checks for different types of properties (for instance, hyper-
properties [65] like information flow, and liveness properties
like termination). We also plan to apply our technique on a
larger scale by using safety-critical programs, such as flight
controllers, as seed programs with the goal of generating new,
challenging verification benchmarks.
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